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In modern Western democracies,  economic and political institutions 
often have been criticized on moral grounds. The arguments pinpoint the 
resulting inequalities and inefficiencies as the evidence of these 
institutions' inadequacy to provide justice. However, evaluating institutions 
in retrospect (ex post),  by contrasting their ex-post  resource allocation  with 
other allocations known to be feasible ex post, is misleading. Social 
decisions must be made under conditions of uncertainty. Hence, institutions 
must be evaluated before the uncertainty is resolved (ex ante),  i.e., 
according to their expected performance,  as delimited by the information 
available at the time decisions are made. So an institution can be condemned 
only if an alternative one exists yielding preferable outcomes (by any measure 
to be decided upon) under the same ex-ante  information set. 
This view is mainly endorsed by economists in the latter part of the 
twentieth century. However, it ignores the process by which a given 
institution is to be chosen. The process is itself an institution,  so that 
the statement of the problem embeds in an infinite regress: The process must 
itself be the object of choice of some process which, once again, is itself an 
institution and therefore the object of choice of another process. Unless this 
infinite regress is resolved, further inquiries on social-choice  theory will 
be limited in scope. Furthermore,  because institutional decisions are actually 
made, a proper theoretical account must capture the process. 
This paper is concerned with the solution of the infinite regress 
problem as it arises in social-choice  theory. My approach is to draw on 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmarguments that consider social choices in game-theoretic  environments where 
information is decentralized,  and whose fundamental outcomes are the 
procedures conducive for players to coordinate decisions. In  the tradition of 
game theory,  these procedures are called mechanisms. The objective is to 
establish the existence of a universal mechanism, i.e., a mechanism whose 
strategy spaces include all possible proposals to change the mechanism. 
Section I outlines what I have termed the "Gauthier framework" and 
elaborates  how the infinite regress arises. Section I1 maps out a general 
style for solving recursive specifications,  with category theory providing the 
concepts needed for the construction of a universal mechanism. Section I11 
adapts the universal mechanism construction,  in  Vassilakis (1989),  to the Nash 
demand game,  which can be seen as a formal Gauthier bargaining setup. 
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The analogy between individual choice and social choice has been aptly 
formulated by John  Rawls (1971):  As each individual rationally decides what 
constitutes his own good,  a society must decide on its system of justice. 
Thus,  a society must be modeled as if it has an objective function. In 
decision theory, the view supporting rational individual choice is that of 
expected utility maximization. The task of social-choice  theory is to 
construct an  objective function from individual utility functions. Social 
choice then  must be a product of meditated choice by its individuals. 
To extract a social-objective  function (social-welfare  function), 
Rawls suggests putting any rational individual behind the veil of ignorance 
and asking that person to select the basic rules for a society. This person's 
chosen rules are the principles of justice,  to which all persons should agree. 
As David Gauthier remarked,  Rawls' approach is not a viable solution for the 
rational-choice  problem because it requires individuals to form a concept of 
justice prior to the original agreement. From the parallel between the 
individual and social choice,  such a prior concept cannot be justified. It is 
itself a principle of justice and should be the outcome rather than the 
assumption of the theory. 
The individual preferences (utilities) must be the only argument of 
the social-welfare  function. If society's preference is represented by a 
mapping, then the question becomes how should it depend on individual utility 
functions? 
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justice are those principles for making social decisions or choices to which 
rational individuals,  each seeking to cooperate with her fellows in order to 
maximize her own utility,  would agree." A desirable social welfare function is 
not the outcome of single optimization  problems,  but the outcome of mutually 
consistent  optimization problems. The mutual consistency is formalized  by the 
solution concept of a game. 
Gauthier proceeds to propose a bargaining game in the spirit of a Nash 
demand game.  However,  the game  '  s bargaining procedures are exogenously 
specified (see Gauthier [1982],  p. 256).  For example,  he insists that all 
parties must be equally able to advocate and advance their intere'sts (fair 
play).  Furthermore, all agents must have an identical information set when 
decisions are made. He then shows that all players have the same dominant 
strategy,  whose outcome is individually rational (weakly preferred by all 
agents over nonparticipation),  and incentive compatible (truthful reporting is 
a dominant strategy for all players). 2 
There are two ways to build on Gauthier's work. The first is to relax 
the complete information assumption. In  bargaining games,  allocations are type 
contingent (an agent's type is usually characterized  by his preferences and 
information  set).  In  general,  agents will not take the same actions in 
************ 
Length constraints preclude a presentation of a formal account of 
Gauthier's game. Please see the referenced  work for a full exposition. 
'  Gauthier does not explicitly use these terms. However,  by a Coasian 
argument,  these results can  be directly extracted. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmequilibrium because their actions reveal their private information,  which 
might have an adverse effect on their payoff. This, in turn, restricts the set 
of feasible  mechanisms. To illustrate,  the appendix contains a simple voting 
game,  first advanced by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). 
Second,  the comments directed at Rawls' veil of ignorance can be 
channeled against any exogenous condition that the philosopher imposes. Fair 
play (on the procedural level) is itself a principle of justice and hence 
should not be assumed. One could surmise that fair play must be agreed upon by 
some prior bargaining session,  but the rules of this session cannot be 
exogenously imposed either. Therefore,  we must construct yet another 
bargaining mechanism to solve the problem at this level.3 Clearly, this 
problem will appear at every level. The resulting infinite regress must be 
dealt with by constructing a mechanism in which strategy spaces contain 
proposals for amending the rules of any game; I call this mechanism universal. 
This argument is beyond a mere technicality. If  we are to extract the 
principles of justice from the equilibrium of a game based on a given 
mechanism, then it is imperative to show that such a mechanism is not only 
feasible,  but that it is chosen exclusively by the players, and not introduced 
exogenously  by the analyst through the procedural rules. Consider a game, 
representing a society,  with n agents faced with the problem of allocating the 
resources in their economy. I refer to this game as the underlying game. 
Initially,  all agents have a given endowment and a set of strategies. If  play 
************ 
This idea is advanced in Crawford (1985). 
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resulting  Nash equilibrium is usually Pareto inefficient. As a parable,  we can 
think of the well-known  prisoners' dilemma game. The Nash equilibrium 
coincides  with both players confessing,  which is clearly suboptimal to both 
not confessing.4 Now, agents can suggest Pareto improvements  by attempting 
preplay negotiations. Players try to coordinate their actions through 
mechanisms that determine the play of the underlying game. Preplay 
negotiations can be viewed as a separate round of bargaining over mechanisms, 
but there is no guarantee that an agreement will be reached in this game 
either. The point is that whatever procedural constraints the philosopher 
wishes to introduce,  he must show them to be the outcome of a previous stage 
of bargaining. Furthermore,  this point remains valid whether the constraints 
are introduced on the procedures of the underlying game or on the procedures 
of the subsequent  preplay negotiations. 
This section concludes with a brief discussion concerning the solution 
concept of a game and Nash equilibria. Although it may appear that this paper 
has identified a Nash equilibrium as the solution to a game, this view is 
misleading. Instead, I present the concept of a Nash equilibrium along the 
same lines as Kreps (1990):  "The concept (of a Nash equilibrium) is advanced 
as an answer to the question: If there is an obvious way to play the game (a 
way that all players can figure out and all expect the others to do the same), 
************ 
Once again,  length constraints forbid offering a full account of the 
prisoners' dilemma game. However,  this game is popular enough to be found in 
almost any book related to game theory. 
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paper,  is that the Nash  equilibrium concept  is the necessary, yet not 
sufficient, condition for an outcome  to be  a solution. 
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The previous section concluded by asserting that the solution to a 
game must be a Nash equilibrium. This section  introduces the concept that 
game theory and,  subsequently,  economic theory have been employed to prove the 
existence of equilibria. I then proceed to offer a general style (general 
approach) for solving infinite regress,  while introducing the associated 
mathematical notions. 
Given a noncooperative game G=(I,S,U), where I is the set of players, 
S the vector of strategy spaces,  and U:II(S)--->R a utility function for 
each agent,  we can define a best reply map for all its  in I.5  The best 
reply map provides a natural relation to equilibrium points. An equilibrium 
point must be a best reply to itself,  and any strategy combination that is a 
best reply to itself must be an equilibrium point. The following lemma 
formalizes this concept. 
1. Lemma: (Friedman [I9861 p. 36) Let G=(I,S,B) be a noncooperative game. 
s E  S is an equilibrium point of G iff s E f(s),  i.e.,  s is a fixed 
point of f. 
So,  given the mathematical specification of a game, the problem of 
solving for the equilibria reduces to the existence of fixed points. 
The best reply mapping for player i is defined as a relationship 
associating each strategy combination  of s E S with  si E Si according 
to the following rule: fi(s)=(ti  E S,  Ui(s\ti)=max  U(s\sti)).  The best 
reply mapping is f(s)=fl(s)x  ...  xfn(s). 
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point are sought thereafter.  6 
Let us now investigate a bargaining game. Suppose we have two agents 
(1 and 2),  and one perfectly divisible good (X).  Agents have identical utility 
functions,  and without loss of generality we let Ul(x)=U2(x)=x.  The players 
must agree on a division of the good. They simultaneously announce a demand 
D(xi)  E R+,  with i=l, 2. If agreement is achieved, the agreed-upon 
division is implemented. If  no agreement is achieved, the good is evenly split 
between the players: 1 gets X/2  and 2 gets X/2.  For the moment,  we assume the 
players know each other's utility functions. Therefore,  players know each 
other's reaction function f  :R+-  - ->R+;  in addition, the players know that f is 
common to both. The fixed point solution  of this game is rather trivial 
because 
~(xi)=f(~(xj  )) 
and D(xj)=f  (D(xi) ) , with xi=xj2x/2. 
Let us complicate the situation by relaxing the common knowledge assumption 
and by postulating that if no agreement is achieved, then neither player 
receives anything,  so U1=U2=0. Now players have an incentive to coordinate 
their announcements,  by suggesting mechanisms that induce cooperative play. 
However, equilibrium expectations are too important to ignore. Agents do not 
have the knowledge of each other's reaction functions,  so 1 (2) cannot decide 
on a mechanism unless he forms beliefs on 2 (1)'s  reaction function over 
By stability, I mean that starting with an arbitrary initial point, the 
system will converge to the fixed point. 
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a given mechanism. Let S be the set of all possible mechanisms. Let P(S)  be 
the set of probability measures on S,  such that for  V  s E  S,  s is 
1  assigned a probability p(s).  So 1's beliefs belong to Dl(x  )=P(S),  and 2's 
2  beliefs belong to Dl(x  )=p(S).  Yet,  2 (1)'s  reaction function is itself a 
function of his beliefs. So 1 (2) needs to form beliefs on 2 (1)'s  beliefs 
about 1 (2)'s  reaction function. Thus: 
o2  (x1)=~(~x~,(x2) ) 
2  1  and D2(x  )=P(SxDl(x  )). 
Proceeding in this way,  we get a system of difference equations: 
D~+~(~~)=P(S~D~(~~)) 
2  1  Dt+l(x  )=P(SxDt(x  )), t2l 
with  D~(X~))=P(S)  for i=l,  2. 
1  2  Clearly,  Dt(x  )=Dt(x  )=Dt(x),  t21,  and we can  write 
Dt+l(x>=P(SxDt(x>>=F,(D(x)). 
We can interpret each F-(D(x))  as an attempt at coordinating actions  J 
in Fj-l(D(x)),  that is,  F-(D(x))=F(S-l(D(x))).  In this formulation,  the  J 
players' suggestions about mechanisms are a function of their beliefs about 
each other's reaction mapping. Using arrows,  we can represent the system 
diagramatically: 
2. Diagram: 
Fo(D(x)  )t--  F1(D(x)  )+  F2  (D(x) )+  . .  .+  Fn(D(x)  )+  Fn+l(D(~))  -  -  - 
with FO(D(x))  being the original game played noncooperatively. 
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system of difference equations. Consequently,  traditional fixed-point  theorems 
cannot be invoked. First,  the left-hand  side is a set of points in R+,  while 
the right-hand  side is a set of probability measures. Second,  the domain of F 
cannot be restricted to be a set anymore,  since for a fixed point of F to 
exist,  F must map sets (rather than the elements between them).  So the domain 
of F must be the collection of all sets,  which is not a set,  by the Russell 
paradox. The mathematical tool of categories provides a proper setting.  7 
Indeed,  as will be seen later, category theory provides appropriate notions of 
continuity,  limits and fixed points. 
3. Definition:  A category K is defined by 
i-a  class of objects: x,y,  ...; denoted by obj(K). 
ii-a  class of arrows (morphisms) between those objects: f,g,  ...; 
denoted by K(x,y)  for each x and y in obj(K). 
An associative operation called composition that associates to each 
pair of morphisms f:x--->y,  g:y--->z  a morphism fg:x--->z,  and for every 
object x,  a morphism i&:x--->x, the identity on x,  such that fi&=f  and 
i&g=g  . 
Note that the object class of a category provides a setting for the 
domain of F (defined in section I11 as a collection of strategy sets).  We can 
define a structure preserving relation between categories. 
For a rigorous treatment of category theory, see Arbib and Manes (1975) 
and Mac Lane (1971). 
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Vx E obj(K)  F(x)  E  obj(C),  and to each morphism f  E  K(xl,x2)  a 
morphism F(f)  E  C(F(xl),F(x2)),  in such a way that composition  and 
identity are preserved: 
F(fg)=  (Ff)  (Fg) 
F(i%)=Fi%. 
We can think of a functor F as giving a representation of K in C. Now 
we introduce a concept that translates the representation F to another 
representation  G:K--->C. 
5. Definition: Given two functors F:K-->C  ,and  G:K-->C,  a collection of 
morphisms in C <xn: xF-->xG  with x E  obj(K)>  is a natural transformation 
from functor F to G if for all xl x2 in obj(K)  and for any f  E  K(xl,x2) 
the following diagram commutes,  that is, if different paths yield the same 
overall function. 
I concentrate on (right and left) chains in a category C,  then study their 
relation to fixed-point  concepts.  A right chain is an arbitrary sequence 
<c,/eO>  of morphisms of the form 
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6.  Definition: Given a category K we define its dual  (opposite) category KOP 
by 
obj  (kOp)=obj  (k) 
~'P(a,b)=(b-->a':  f E K(a,b)) 
with composition defined by c-->b-->a=c-->a;  identities are the same as K with 
arrows reversed. 
A left chain in COP is a right chain in C. 
7. Examples: 
We can readily think of a category whose morphisms are left chains. 
Let W be the category with 
i-obj(w)=N  (all natural numbers). 
ii-Vj&i E  obj(w),  if jsi,  3 exactly one arrow from i to j 
(there are no other morphisms). 
If i-->j-->k,  for i,j,k  E  obj(w),  define composition to be the 
unique arrow i-->k.  Identity arrow is i-->i,  for all i20. 
The dual wOP is obtained simply by changing the order of arrows: if j>i, there 
is exactly one morphism from j  to i,  i20. 
Diagram 2,  developed earlier, is an example of left chains. If  we can 
construct an X such that the above diagram commutes at every level,  then we 
would have a candidate for a universal mechanism. In diagrammatic form,  we 
wish to construct 
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with all triangles commuting. 
If vo  ...  vn are natural transformations, then X  would be the limit of 
functor F. Under the proper specification,  X turns out to be the desired fixed 
point. We have motivated the following definitions. 
9.  Definition: A constant functor  Ic:K--->C  is a functor that assigns to 
k E  obj(K)  the same c E obj(C),  and to each morphism in K the identity 
morphism idk  on k. 
10. Definition: Let F:K--->C  be a functor. A limit of F is an object c E  C 
and a natural transformation u: 1,--->F with the following universal property: 
If c' E  obj(C)  such that c' #  c and ut:IC--->F  is any other natural 
transformation,  3 a unique morphism f:c'--->c  in C that makes the 
following diagram commute  tr  k E obj(K). 
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concepts of limits and fixed points can  be generated outside the realm of 
traditional analysis,  which can  be built only on  well-founded  sets. So far,  a 
definition of these terms has been offered using categories (objects and 
arrows) and functors.  The relation  between the limit and the fixed point(s)  of 
a functor is formalized by the generalized Kleene fixed-point  theorem. First, 
we must introduce some new concepts 
11. Definition: Given x&y  E  obj(K),  f:x-->y  is said to be an isomorphism 
if 3  a g:y--->x  such that fg=idy and gf=idx. In diagrammatic form, 
commutes. 
12. Definition: Given a functor F:K--->K,  an object x of K is a fixed point of 
K if 3 an isomorphism f:x--->F(x) in K. 
13. Definition: A terminal object in a category K is an object denoted by 1 
such that V  x E  obj(K),  3  a unique morphism !:x--->l.  An initial 
object in K is a terminal object in KOP. 
14. Definition:  A functor F:C-->K  is continuous if whenever C,:C,<---C,+~  is a 
left chain in C and (U,u) is a limit for <cn>, then (mT,Fu) is a limit for 
<FCn> . 
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initial object 1 such that every right chain has a colimit. Then every 
continuous functor F:C--->C  has a least fixed point the colimit of the right 
chain 
.  .  . 4-~2(1)  'F(1)  -1. 
Proof. (see Manes and Arbib  [1986],  p. 270). 
Note that the Kleene fixed-point  theorem applies to right chains. But 
as indicated in diagram 8,  we are interested in the limit of a left chain. 
Theorem 16 establishes a fundamental result of category theory that allows us 
to state the dual of the fixed-point.theorem  without a reference to any proof. 
16. Dualitv Principle for Category Theory (Arbib and Manes [1975]): 
Let T be any construct defined for any category K. Then the dual of T, 
called COT,  is the construct defined for any category K by defining T in KOP 
and reversing all arrows. 
If T is a theorem true for all categories K,  then the dual of T, 
obtained by reversing all the arrows of T,  is true for all categories KOP,  and 
thus (since (KOP)OP=K)  is true for all categories. 
17. Dual: Let K be a category with a terminal object D(x)  and such that every 
left chain has a limit. Then every continuous functor F:K--->K  has a greatest 
fixed point the limit of the left chain 
FO(D(x))+  F1(D(x))t---  F2(D(x))-  ...+-.  Fn(D(x))+  Fn+l(D(~)).... 
Stability of the fixed point is the result of it being an 
approximation from the iteration process represented by the left chain. The 
uniqueness of the greatest fixed point is settled by the following results. 
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19. Corollarv: The greatest fixed point of F:K-->K  is unique up to 
isomorphism. 
Note that F may have other fixed points;  however,  they cannot be obtained as a 
limit of the same chain. 
20. Proposition: This specification guarantees that the fixed point (if it 
exists) is continually dependent on the parameters of the game. 
Proof. As a limit X is contingent on the underlying game by the construction 
of the left chain. 
Manes and Arbib (1986) present a reference for the adaptation of 
categorical techniques to computations of data types. Vassilakis (1989, 1990) 
provides categorical constructions relevant to economic theory. 
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The previous section showed how the existence of a universal mechanism 
reduces to the existence of the fixed point of a functor. I have not 
explicitly constructed that functor;  nor have I determined its proper domain 
and range categories.  This section presents an adaptation of the universal 
mechanism constructed in Vassilakis (1989).  The underlying game consists of 
the Nash demand game. Agents simultaneously announce a demand vector xi E 
Xi,  the dimension of which is determined by the number of traded goods in that 
economy. Every player has an initial endowment ei. A von Neuman-Morgenstern 
utility function is defined. If the demand matrix x=(x l...xn) is such that 
Cxi 5 Cei,  i.e.,  markets clear,  then every agent receives his demand, 
thus a utility of Ui(xi).  Otherwise, if Exi > Cei then the game is 
played noncooperatively: every player consumes his endowment and receives a 
utility of Ui(ei)  5 Ui(xi).  The Nash equilibria form the set of demand 
matrices yielding Pareto-efficient  outcomes. 
This specification of Nash equilibria eliminates suboptimal equilibria 
similar to the equilibrium arising in the prisoners' dilemma game. However, 
the game has multiple equilibria. Every matrix x with the specification 
Cxi  = Cei is Pareto optimal and hence an equilibrium. Players can 
suggest different mechanisms to chose among the equilibria by playing a game 
over mechanisms. Yet,  as argued earlier, it must also be shown that the latter 
game yields a solution. Eventually,  we are led to an infinite regress. The 
construct,  presented in Vassilakis (1989),  considers an aggregate revision 
functor that gives every player the power to suggest a new outcome at every 
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fixed point of a functor over mechanisms. 
Let I be the following category: 
Obj(I)=players,  denoted by an integer i=l,  ...,  n 
K(i,i)=idi,  for all i in obj(1).  There are no other morphisms. 
Categories with only identity morphisms are called discrete. 
Let a collection of strategy spaces be a functor S:I-->K,  where K is a 
category whose objects are abstract sets and whose morphisms are abstract 
input/output programs. A given S(i)  specifies player its  strategy space. One 
of the benefits of choosing category I to be discrete is that it enables us to 
define the aggregate strategy space as SlxS2x  ...  Sn= II  Si (X 
denotes the product). 
I define a mechanism to be a triple (S,f,O),  where S=  II  Si , 
0 E  obj(K)  is an outcome space,  and f: II  Si--->O  is a morphism in K. A 
primitive mechanism can  be depicted as a triple (A,~,R~)  with A E  obj  (K) 
such that 
A=  II  Ai = 11  [0,  Cei 1; 
a:  II  [0,  Cei 1--->Rn  , 
a(xl,x2,  ...,  xn)=(xl,x2, ...,  xn)  if Exi 5 Cei 
and (el,e2,  ...,  en)  if Exi > Cei. 
Here the primitive mechanism denotes the play of the Nash demand game (the 
underlying game) without cooperation,  capturing all the multiple equilibria. 
In order to relate the ideas developed so far,  the next section introduces 
some new concepts. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmDefinition: The category of functors from I to K,  denoted by [I-->K],  has as 
objects all functors F:I--->K  and as morphisms all natural transformations 
between them. In this instance I call -->  the functor space constructor. 
Definition:  Given categories K and C,  I construct the product  category KxC 
as follows: <k,c> E  obja(xC>  if k E  obj(K)  and c E  obj (C).  A 
morphism of KxC is a pair <f,g,>  with f a morphism in K and g a morphism 
in C. Composition is defined in terms of the composites in K and C: 
<f',gfXf,g,>  = <f'f,glg>. 
Definition: A coproduct is a colimit of a functor F:I--->K  on a discrete 
category I. For example,  in the category Set,  whose objects are all sets and 
whose morphisms are the inclusion map, coproduct is the disjoint union. The 
coproduct of two objects is denoted by "+". 
Definition:  A polynomial functor F:K--->K  is a functor that can be constructed 
from constant or identity functors through the use of products,  coproducts and 
compositions. 
Each agent must be endowed with the capability of either proposing to 
coordinate in a given mechanism or proposing to coordinate on the proposals in 
that mechanism. So an agent's revision functor is defined as 
Ri:[I-->K]xK--->KxK  by Ri(S,O)=(S',Of),  where 
Of=  [II Si--->0]  is a new outcome space 
and S'= Ofx[O'x  ...  xOf-->O'] 
is a new strategy space for each player i. The revision functor defines what 
each agent can propose. This definition captures the fact that given a game 
with strategy space S and outcome space 0,  each agent i can simultaneously 
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proposal on  how to coordinate actions on the original game (S,O).  The second 
proposal is a mechanism that selects one out of n proposals in 0'. 
The aggregate revision functor 
R:[I-->K]xK--->[I-->K]xK 
is defined by R(S,O)=(A,Rn)+(~',O'),  where Sf:I-->K  with II  S'(i)=S1;  S' 
and 0' are defined as above. A universal mechanism (S,f,O)  must be a fixed 
point of that functor: (S,O)-(A,Rn)+R(s,O).  The meaning of the fixed point 
equation is that a strategy is either primitive or a revision strategy for 
each i in obj(I),  where Si-Ai+[O1x  ...  x0'-->01]  with O1=[II S-->O], 
and that an outcome is either primitive or an outcome of the revision 
mechanism X-Rn+[II  Si--->O]. 
To satisfy the statement of the functorial fixed-point  theorems, a 
a category K is needed that satisfies the following: 
1. K has limits of the left chains. 
2. K has a terminal object. 
3. K has polynomial functors,  all of which are continuous. 
4.  K has a functor (called a function space constructor) -->: KxK--->L 
defined on two objects x and y in obj(K)  by -->(x,y)=[x-->y],  such that 
--> is continuous. Note that the morphism space does not belong to K but to 
a larger category L of which K is a subcategory. In other words, L is the 
category with the desired function space. However,  L  has too many morphisms 
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morphisms in L to K and obtain functoriality (see Manes and Arbib  [1986], 
p. 313). 
To state the main theorem of this section,  again, some new concepts 
must be identified. I turn to partially ordered sets (posets). A poset can be 
seen as a specialization of a category that allows for much insight about 
general categories with minimal loss of generality. When posets are regarded 
as categories,  a monotone map  (function) represents the same concept as a 
functor. 
Definition:  A partially ordered set,  poset, is a pair (P,R)  where P is a set 
and R is a binary relation on P,  which is a partial order on P. Then the 
following axioms hold: 
i-  Reflexivity: xRx 
ii-  Transitivity: xRy A  yRz + xRz 
iii-  Antisymmetry: xRy A  yRx -+  xEy. 
Note that posets are themselves categories;  examples are W and wOP. 
Definition:  A poset is a domain if it has a least element and if whenever 
(xn: n=1,2,3,  ...) is an ascending chain in P (i.e.,  5 xn+l),  then a least 
upper bound (LUB)  {xn) exists. 
Definition: Given domains D and D', let [D-->Dl]  be the set of all continuous 
functions f:D-->Dl  partially ordered by fRg o f(x)Rg(x),  V  x E  D. 
Proposition (Manes and Arbib  [1986]):  [D-->D1]  is a domain under R. I call 
[D-  ->Dl  ] a function space domain. 
Definition:  Given domains Dl,  ...,  Dn,  define 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmi-  Dlx  ...  xDn=(xl, ...,  xn)  with xi E D,  (xl,  ...,%  ) I  (yl,  ...,y  n) 
iff xiRyi E Di. 
ii-  Dl+.  .  .+D~={~)U(~)XD~U..  .u(n)xDnl  where 42, 
V  z  in Dl+.  . .+Dn,  while (i  ,x)R(j  ,y) if i=j and xRy in Di. 
Proposition: Dlx  ...  xDn and Dl+  ...+  Dn are both domains. 
Definition: Categories of Domains 
i-  Let Domc be the category with 
obj  (Dom,)  =domains 
and K(D,D1)=continuous maps. 
ii-  Let Dom be the category with 
ob  j  (Dom)  =domains 
and K(D,D1)=strict maps. 
iii-  Let Domadj be the category with 
ob  j  (Domadj  )=domains 
and K(D,D1)=maps having an adjoint. 
Remark: Domadj is a subcategory of Dam,. 
Fact: Both Domc and Dom have limits (colimits) of left (right) chains,  as well 
as an  initial (terminal) object. 
Fact: Any polynomial functor Dome-->Dome is co-continuous  and therefore has a 
least fixed point. 
Proof (sketch).  Constant functors and the identity functor are 
co-continuous,  and so is any composition  of co-continuous  functors. The 
product of co-continuous  functors is continuous in closed categories. The 
coproduct of co-continuous  functors is also co-continuous. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe necessary and sufficient resources are now in place to provide a 
category that can capture the universal mechanism I have,  so far,  been 
seeking. 
Theorems  : 
i-  D--->[D-->Dl  extends to a functor Domadj-->Domadj. 
ii-  The terminal object in Dom is terminal Domadj. 
iii- Given a left chain in Domadj with limit (a,n) in Dom, it follows that 
(a,n) is its limit in Domadj. 
iv-  The functor [D-->Dl  is continuous. 
v-  Every polynomial functor Dom-->Dom  maps Domadj into Domadj. 
Proof. Manes and Arbib (1986),  pp. 311-317. 
Indeed,  by inspection Domadj satisfies desiderata 1-4  enumerated 
earlier in this section. However, I have not yet shown the existence of the 
fixed point  . 
Corollarv: (Vassilakis [1989]) A universal mechanism exists. 
Proof.  (S,O)  is defined as a fixed point of a functor defined by the 
continuity-preserving  operations on left-chain  functors (the product operation 
preserves continuity).  The outcome function f:  II  Si--->X  is arbitrary. 
It must still be shown that the transformation of the proposals into 
outcomes is well defined. 
Corollary: (Vassilakis 1989) If (S,f,O)  is a universal mechanism, then there 
exists a unique outcome function f' :  II  S'  i+A-  ->o'+R~  (with S'  and 0' 
defined as above) that is consistent with f,  in the sense of making the 
following diagram commute: 
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g  O'+  0 
where O:S1+A-->S  and g:~'+~n-->~  are the fixed-point  isomorphisms. 
Proof. f~=~-l(f  (0))  is well defined. Note that f' transforms proposals 
into outcomes. 
Hence, f' extends uniquely to an  outcome function  on the proposed 
revisions of f.  This completes the specification of the "revised" Nash demand 
game  . 
So far,  I  have defined f to be an input/output morphism of  K (a 
function of Domadj).  An explicit specification  of f is tantamount to an 
explicit specification  of the game,  but this must be addressed in future 
research. 
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This paper has attempted to show how  category theory provides the 
tools for solving the infinite regress that appears in the statement of  many 
social-choice theories.  A  revision functor was  constructed and specified on 
the Nash  demand  game.  Solving the "revised" Nash  demand  game  is beyond  the 
scope of  the present project and will  have  to be  explored in another paper. 
The  aim here was  simply  to outline the main  difficulties facing social-choice 
theories and  to show how  categorical tools can be used  for constructing the 
appropriate models by providing a setting for the concepts of  continuity, 
limits, and  fixed points. 
The  discontent with moral philosophy has been articulated by  Williams 
(1985).  In his account,  the difficulties are rooted in the fact that modern 
morality theories are "...governed by  a dream  of  a community  of  reason that is 
too far removed ..." (p.  197).  In our case, the exogenous bargaining 
procedures  and  the "nice" properties they must  have  in order for the Gauthier 
results to go  through  are essentially the embodiment  of  that community  of 
reason.  The  novelty  in this paper  stems  from  its ability to provide  a 
construction that escapes the analyst's biases. 
Other pertinent problems  can be settled by  the same  techniques;  for 
example,  bounded  rationality and universal beliefs spaces  (see Mertens  and 
Zamir [1985]).  While  there remains much  to be done  to expand  the boundaries 
of moral  philosophy,  I hope  to have  offered a promising  approach. 
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This game illustrates how information leakages restrict the set of 
feasible mechanisms.  In this game,  agents' information sets are not 
identical.  I define an incentive-efficient mechanism as an incentive- 
compatible mechanism such that there is no other incentive-compatible 
mechanism that is at least as good for all agents,  and strictly better for at 
least one agent,  in the truthful equilibrium.  The term ex ante refers to a 
situation in  which agents have not yet observed their types; interim refers to 
the case in  which agents have observed only their types and not other agents' 
types. 
Consider the two-agent  economy,  where an agent is either type a or 
type b with equal probability.  Suppose we have three decisions {A,B,C). The 
utility of each agent under every decision is self regarding and a function of 
his respective type as represented in table 1. 
Table 1 
Let D be the following decision rule: 
D(la,2a)=A,  D(la,2b)=B,  D(lb,2a)=C,  D(lb,2b)=B. 
Decision rule D selects C only if agent two's type is la. Otherwise, if two is 
type 2b, then only decision B is chosen.  Rule D is incentive compatible, 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwhich can be confirmed by inspection.  For types la,  lb,  and 2b, it is trivial 
to show that an honest reporting is the dominant strategy.  Type 2a can either 
get B with probability one,  by actually reporting his false type,  or get A or 
C with equal probability by honestly reporting his type.  Since the expected 
utility of both prospects is identical for type 2a,  he is willing to report 
his type honestly when D is implemented (under risk neutrality).  Decision 
rule D is interim incentive-efficient. However, if agent one knows that he is 
type la,  then he knows that both he and player two prefer decision A over the 
outcome proposed by decision rule D.  Thus,  agent two would expect (with 
probability one) agent one to call for decision A if one was type la.  If 
agent one insists on D then agent two can infer that type one is lb.  In this 
event,  agent two is better off reporting 2b,  regardless of his true type, in 
order to avoid decision C altogether;  decision D's incentive-compatibility 
property is thereby destroyed.  Because of its simplicity,  this example does 
not show an even stronger case where an ex-ante  incentive efficiency is not 
interim incentive-efficient;  however, it should be clear that such a case is 
possible. 
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